
The Future of European Defense

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▶ ***“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure
nor so free”***

European Security Strategy, 2003

▶ ***“Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we
must think”***

Sir Winston Churchill

(Quoted in Jo Coolmont & Maurice de Langlois:
“Recalibrating CSDP-NATO Relations. The Real Pivot”)

A Changing Security Environment

- ▶ The **redistribution of power** within the international system, triggered by the end of the Cold War, has been accelerated by the current **world crisis**; consequently the pivot of the system is shifting from **the Atlantic to the Pacific**.
- ▶ The Western, particularly European “**centrality**” in the system is beginning to be challenged by outside power centers; the international system becomes increasingly difficult to be “managed” by its creators.
- ▶ The US – visibly affected by the Iraqi and Afghan experiences – is shifting its attention to the Asia-Pacific area, being reluctant to engage in new conflicts (see Libya, Mali, Syria).
- ▶ Europe is caught between the **need to increase its share in its own defense** (threats are more complex and closer to us) and the **lack of political will to do so**, motivated by the lack of financial resources due to the current crisis.

Pro Memoria

- ▶ “Peace and Security” are not permanent; one has to make constant efforts to preserve them, once attained (WWI was the war to end all wars ...)
- ▶ If we do not plan for tomorrow’s contingencies, because today there is no apparent need to, is to practically invite those contingencies ...
- ▶ What we are discarding today so easily, will be very difficult to get back tomorrow, if we need to...
- ▶ In a world dominated by “power politics”, voluntary restraining of the use of military instrument is suicidal, especially at a time of increased rivalry for power and status in the emerging new international system.

The Task Ahead

- ▶ **Europe should bolster its defense (of territory and interests)**
- ▶ To compensate for the **strategic reorientation** of the US towards Asia/Pacific (overcome the “culture” that, ultimately, the US will defend Europe anyway ...)
- ▶ To face the **increasing challenges** confronting us more and more frequently (see Malta; Africa – responsibility of Europe)
- ▶ To preserve its **technological edge** – crucial for retaining Europe’s lead within the international system (confer credibility to Europe’s declared bid to become a major actor - politically and militarily, too – in the international arena)

Necessary Actions

- ▶ **Achieve a certain degree of commonality in perceiving the current threats and challenges:**
 - ▶ the Cold War “Soviet threat” has been replaced by a “host of threats” perceived differently by the Member States – divergence accentuated by the reinforcement of **national** perspectives during the current crisis; that has a negative impact on both operational requirements for equipment and, most important, on the political will to engage);

- ▶ **Periodic “strategic evaluations” at the EU Council level;**

- ▶ Possibly a **White Book on security and defense:**
 - **Common educational and training standards** (build on NATO’s)
 - **Common projects** (navigation and space situational awareness, drones, air-refueling, smart ammo, air transport ...)
 - **Common operational requirements for equipment and materiel**

▶ **Prior to creating new instruments, make the existing ones work**

(we created instruments like the BGs, but we approach crises with improvisations ...)

- ▶ Military flexible (modular – lessons learned)
- ▶ Properly supported logistically (EU assets – a CSDP Warehouse – modeled along the lines of NATO Support Agency)
- ▶ Financially sustainable (start up fund, like the one for non-military crises; some states have manpower, but no money, other have money but not manpower ...)
- ▶ Streamlined political-decision making to engage (strengthened cooperation between the national Parliaments of participating countries)
- ▶ [GET THE POLITICAL WILL TO ACT](#) – crucial (slides 5 & 7)

NATO – EU Relations

- ▶ The majority of the EU Member States (22 out of 28) are basing their defense primarily on NATO (Art 42 of the Lisbon Treaty)
- ▶ NATO and EU are complementary, with the former strong on “hard power” and the latter on “soft power”
- ▶ NATO wants to develop its “civilian” component, while EU must enlarge its “military” footprint
- ▶ Berlin Plus” arrangement is a “one way street” (NATO primacy – EU should have access to NATO assets only when and if NATO declines participation)
- ▶ NATO-EU relations should be “freed” from its “hostage” status created by bilateral animosity between some of their respective members

Industry

- ▶ In the field of **industry**, the most pressing situation is to RESTORE AND CONSOLIDATE DEMAND
- ▶ **Stop slashing the defense budgets**
- ▶ **Move towards a single defense market** (everyone should have a stake in it – not only the “big” ones ...)
- ▶ **Encourage and support R&D**
- ▶ The Commission Communication (“Towards a more competitive and efficient defense security sector”) – partial answer to the current challenges, by approaching **defense** (national) from the **civilian, community regulation of industry**

The December 2013 European Council on Defense and Security

- ▶ There is a cluster of unresolved problems and negative trends accumulated since 2008 – high expectations (should be realistically calibrated)
- ▶ It should be a “strategic” rather than “bureaucratic” summit (vision > paper)
- ▶ It should initiate a follow-up process – provide the necessary ignition for a reconsideration of CSDP – and not be a one stunt event
- ▶ This is the time to assemble all necessary changes to the treaties, including with regard to defense and security

Conclusion

- ▶ **GET THE POLITICAL WILL TO ACT**
- ▶ **RESTORE AND CONSOLIDATE DEMAND**